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ABSTRACT 
Wireless sensor networks are currently the greatest innovation in the field of telecommunications. WSNs have a 
wide range of potential applications, including security and surveillance, control, actuation and maintenance of 
complex systems and fine-grain monitoring of indoor and outdoor environments. However security is one of the 
major aspects of Wireless sensor networks due to the resource limitations of sensor nodes. Those networks are 
facing several threats that affect their functioning and their life. In this paper we present security attacks in 
wireless sensor networks, and we focus on comparison and analysis of recent Intrusion Detection schemes in 
WSNs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Recent advances in wireless and micro electronic communications have enabled the development of a 
new type of wireless network called wireless sensor network (WSN).Wireless sensor networks are 
associated with vulnerable characteristics such as open-air transmission and self-organizing without a 
fixed infrastructure [1]. Consequently security of wireless sensor networks (WSN) is the most 
challenge for this type of network [2].  Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) can play an important role 
in detecting and preventing security attacks. This paper presents a review of the security attacks in 
wireless sensor network and analyzed some of the existing IDS models and architectures. Finally a 
comparative study and a discussion of IDS models will be presented.  
2. RELATED WORK 
Wireless sensor networks are not immune to the risks of destruction and decommissioning. Some of 
these risks are identical to those in Ad-Hoc networks, and others are specific to the sensors. Several 
articles [6][7][8][9][10] have presented security attacks and issues in WSNs. Intrusion detection 
system (IDS) defined as the second line of defense after cryptography, allows the detection and 
prevention of internal and external attacks. 
In [18, it is presented a Rule-based IDS called also Signature-based. Most of the techniques in these 
schemes follow three main phases: data acquisition phase, rule application phase and intrusion 
detection phase. In [19], it is proposed two approaches to improve the security of clusters for sensor 
networks using IDS. The first approach uses a model-based on authentication, and the second scheme 
is called Energy-Saving. IN [21] a hybrid intrusion detection system (HIDS) model has been 
anticipated for wireless sensor networks. This paper does not promote a solution. Rather, it is a 
comparative study of existing model of intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks. Our aim is to 
provide a better understanding of the current research issues in this field.  
 
 
3. SECURITY GOALS IN WSN 
We can classify the security goals into two goals: main and secondary. The main goals include 
security objectives that should be available in any system (confidentiality, availability, integrity and 
authentication). The other category includes secondary goals (self-organization, secure localization, 
Time synchronization and Resilience to attacks) [3] [4].  
 Confidentiality (Forbid access to unwanted third parties) 
 Authentication (Identity verification and validation) 
 Availability (Service has to be always available) 
 Integrity (Data is exchanged without malicious alteration) 
 Self Organization(Every sensor node needs to be independent and flexible enough to be self-
organizing and self-healing) 
 Secure localization (Sensor network often needs location information accurately and 
automatically) 
 Time synchronization (Sensor radio may be turned off periodically in order to conserve power) 
 Resilience to attacks (The covenant of a single node must not violate the security of the whole 
network). Figure1 below summarizes security goals for wireless sensor network.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Security Goals for WSN 
4. SECURITY ATTACKS IN WSN 
The different characteristics of wireless sensor networks (energy limited, low-power computing, use of 
radio waves, etc...) expose them to many security threats. We can classify the attacks into two main 
categories [5]: Active and Passive. In passive attacks, attackers are typically camouflaged, i.e. hidden, 
and tap the communication lines to collect data.  In active attacks, malicious acts are carried out not 
only against data confidentiality but also data integrity. Several papers have presented the security 
attacks in WSN [6][7][8][9][10]. 
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 Spoofed, altered or replayed routing information 
May be used for loop construction, attracting or repelling traffic, extend or shorten source route. 
 Selective forwarding 
In this attack, the attacker prevents the transmission of some packets. They will be removed later by 
the malicious node. 
 Worm hole attack: 
The wormhole attack requires insertion of at least two malicious nodes. These two nodes are 
interconnected by a powerful connection for example a wired link. The malicious node receives 
packets in one section of the network and sends them to another section of the network.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sybil attack: 
A malicious node presents multiple identities to the other nodes in the network. This poses a 
significant threat to routing protocols and will cause the saturation of the routing tables of the nodes 
with incorrect information.  
 
Figure 3. Sybil attack 
 
 Black hole attack: 
The attack involves inserting a malicious node in the network. This node, by various means, will 
modify the routing tables to force the maximum neighboring nodes passing the information through 
him. Then like a black hole in space, all the information that will go in it will never be retransmitted. 
Figure 2. Worm hole attack 
 
 
 
       Figure 4. Black hole attack 
 Hello Flooding: 
Discovery protocols on WSNs use HELLO messages types to discover its neighboring nodes. In an 
attack type HELLO Flooding, an attacker will use this mechanism to saturate the network and 
consume energy. 
 
 Figure 5. Hello flooding attack 
 Acknowledgement spoofing 
In this attack, the attacker tries to convince the sender that the weak link is strong or that a dead node 
is alive. Therefore, all packets passing through this link or this node will be lost. 
 Denial-of-Service Attacks 
A denial-of-service (DoS) targets the availability and capacity reduction of network services.  Physical 
constraints of the sensor networks and the nature of their deployment environment, make them 
vulnerable to DoS attacks more than any other type of network. In this section we will review 
important DoS scenarios for each layer of the WSN. In [11] Wang et al. (2006) have classified the 
DoS attacks that could target each layer of the WSN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Layer Attacks Defense 
Physical Jamming 
Spread-spectrum, priority messages, 
lower duty cycle, region mapping, 
mode change 
Link 
Collision Error-correction code 
Exhaustion Rate limitation 
Unfairness Small frames 
Network 
Spoofed routing 
information, and selective 
forwarding 
Egress filtering, 
authentication, monitoring 
Sinkhole Redundancy checking 
Sybil 
Authentication, 
monitoring, redundancy 
Wormhole Authentication, probing 
Hello Flood Authentication 
Transport 
Session Hijacking. aggregation data 
SYN flooding Package authentication 
Application 
Data Corruption. 
Repudiation 
Authentification 
 
Table 1. Various DOS attacks on WSNs and their countermeasures 
5. COUNTERMEASURES 
To counter the attacks threatened networks wireless sensors, several research teams are trying to find 
appropriate solutions. These solutions must take into account the specificities of wireless sensor 
networks. We need to find simple solutions to secure the network while consuming the least possible 
energy and adapt these solutions to a low power computing. In the range of these solutions include 
mechanisms such as data partitioning, the use of appropriate cryptographic methods, intruder detection 
by location or even the confidence index. Wood and Stankovic [12] studied DoS attacks and possible 
defense. In [13][14] a suite of optimized security protocols for wireless sensor network is presented. 
SPIN (Security Protocol for Information via Negotiation) has two security mechanisms: SNEP and 
TESLA. SNEP provides data confidentiality and data authentication. TESLA provides source 
authentication in multicast scenarios by using MAC chaining.  It is based on loose time 
synchronization between the sender and the receivers. INSENS (Intrusion Tolerant routing for 
wireless sensor networks) this protocol allows the base station to draw an accurate map of the network 
that will establish the routing tables for each node [15]. Du,et al. [16] propose LEAP+ (Localized 
Encryption and Authentication Protocol), a key management protocol for sensor networks. 
 
 
 
6. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS IN WSN  
After the concept of intrusion detection (ID), which was established in 1980, two major variants of 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) have emerged, Host intrusion detection systems (HIDS) and 
network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) [17]. Intrusion detection is an approach that is 
complementary with respect to mainstream of security mechanisms such as cryptography and access 
control [18]. Intrusion detection can be defined as Intrusion detection can be defined as the automatic 
detection and alarm generation to report that an intrusion has occurred or is in progress. In this section 
we describe the architecture of IDS in WSNs. IDS cannot take preventive action, since they are 
passive in nature, they can only detect intrusion and generate an alarm. The following figure presents 
the four main components of IDS [19]. 
 
Figure 6. IDS components 
There are two distinct technologies of IDS: 
 Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). These systems are designed to intercept and analyze 
packets circulating in the network. All communication in the wireless network are conducted on 
the air and a node can hear the traffic passing from a neighboring node (promiscuous mode) [36]. 
Therefore, the nodes can mutually check the network traffic. This technology applies this concept, 
IDS listens for traffic and individually examine each packet. 
 Host intrusion detection systems (HIDS). Analysis only data on the node where the IDS is 
installed. Any decision is based on information collected at this node. These IDSs use two types of 
sources to provide information about the activity: the log files (file that records all activity on a 
system in standby), and audit trails ( Incoming / outgoing packets node , etc). 
 
5.1 The challenging of designing IDS for WSN 
The IDS solutions developed for wired networks cannot be applied directly to sensor networks, view 
the difference between these two types of networks, this is why it is necessary to introduce an 
intrusion detection system that meets the special features of sensor networks [20]. The design of this 
kind of system for wireless sensor network must satisfy the following properties:  
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Figure 7. Challenging of designing IDS for WSN 
5.2 The requirements of designing IDS for WSN 
In wireless sensor networks, the IDS must satisfy the following properties [21]: 
 Localize auditing: IDS for wireless sensor networks must work with local data and partial audits, 
because in WSN there are no centralized points (apart from the station base) that can collect global 
data auditing. 
 Minimize resources: IDS must use a minimum number of resources for networks. Communication 
between nodes for intrusion detection should not saturate the available bandwidth. 
 Trust no node: Unlike wired networks, nodes sensors can be compromised easily, IDS must not 
trust any node. 
 Be distributed: means that the collection and analysis of data should be in several locations. 
Moreover the distributed approach also applies to the execution of the algorithm of detection and 
alert correlation. 
 Be secure: IDS must be able to withstand attacks.  
Figure 8 below summarizes requirements of designing IDS for WSN. 
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5.3 Architectures for IDS in Wireless Sensor Network 
The nature of wireless sensor networks makes them very vulnerable to attack. The Mobile nodes are 
randomly distributed, there are no physical obstacles for the adversary, therefore, they can be easily 
captured, and attacks can come from all directions and target any node. To tackle these additional 
challenges, several possible IDS architectures exist including standalone IDS, distributed and 
cooperative IDS and hierarchical IDS [22]. 
5.3.1 Standalone IDS 
In this category, each node operates as independent IDS and is responsible for the detection of attacks 
against him. Therefore, the IDS do not cooperate and do not share information with each other. This 
architecture requires that each node is capable of executing and running IDS. 
5.3.2 Distributed and Cooperative IDS 
In this architecture (Zhang et al., 2003), each node has an IDS agent and makes local detection 
decisions by itself, all the nodes cooperate to create a global detection process. The distributed and 
cooperative IDS architecture is more suitable for a flat network configuration than a cluster-based 
multilayered one. 
5.3.3 Hierarchical IDS 
In this category the network is divided into clusters with cluster-heads. In each cluster, a leader plays 
the role of cluster-head. This node is responsible for routing in the group and must accept messages 
from members of the cluster indicating something malicious. Similarly, the cluster-head must detect 
attacks against other cluster-heads in the network. At the same time all cluster-heads can cooperate 
with central base station to form global IDS. 
5.4 Some open research in IDS 
Cross-Layer IDS: Using a cross layer IDS, we could not only pass information between layers but 
also coordinate mechanisms to prevent threats at all layers. 
Dynamic IDS: The IDS that would protect mobile nodes, as in VANET networks. 
Internet of Things IDS: There should be mechanisms that could manage all the objects of our 
everyday life that have an IP address and be connected to the Internet. 
7. INTRUSION DETECTION MODELS FOR WSN 
Due to architectural difference between wired and wireless networks, their IDSs cannot be used 
interchangeably. There are specific techniques for WSN [23]. In this section, we analyze and discus 
some proposed IDSs for WSN.  
7.1 Rule-based IDS 
Rule-based IDS called also Signature-based IDS, articulates on a database of stored prior rules of 
security attacks [24]. Most of the techniques in these schemes follow three main phases: data 
acquisition phase, rule application phase and intrusion detection phase (Silva et al., 2005) [25]. The 
algorithm includes three steps for detecting intrusions. In the first step monitor nodes monitors the 
data. In the second step detection rules will be ranked in order of severity, to the collected information 
to flag failure. The third step is the intrusion detection phase, where the number of failure flagged is 
compared to the expected number of the occasional failures in the network. 
 
 
                                            
Figure 9. Steps for detecting intrusion in rule based IDS 
7.2 Cluster-Based IDS 
Su, et al. [26] has proposed two approaches to improve the security of clusters for sensor networks 
using IDS. The first approach uses a model-based on authentication, which can resist to external 
attacks. Its basic technique is to add a message authentication code (MAC) for each message. 
Whenever a node wants to send a message, it adds to it a timestamp and a MAC is generated by a key-
pair or individually depending on the key role of the sender (cluster-head, member -node, or base 
station). So that the receiver can verify the sender, the security mechanism is used LEAP. The second 
scheme is called Energy-Saving. This approach focuses on the detection of misbehavior both in 
Member nodes (MN) and cluster-head nodes (CH). When misbehavior is detected, the CH broadcasts 
a warning message encrypted with the cluster key to restrain this specific node. 
7.3 Hybrid IDS 
In the Hybrid Approach, both techniques (Cluster-Based and Rule-Based) are combined to form 
Hybrid detection technique. Hybrid detection exploits the advantages of both approaches provides 
simplicity, high safety, low consumption of energy [27] [28].The Hybrid Intrusion Detection System 
achieves the goals of high detection rate and low false positive rate. 
8. Analyses and Discussion 
Comparing analysis, for the advantages and drawbacks of different models: 
Rule-Based : The rule based model is simple, clear levels, and designed for a large-sized WSNs. 
Signature-based IDS need more resource than anomaly-based IDS, and regular updating of the 
database with new attack signatures.  
Cluster-based: The cluster-based model requires Low Energy Consumption, provides high level of 
security. Because of Centralized routing data delivery is guaranteed. In cluster-based IDS Message 
retransmission frequency is high, and the centralized routing may not always use best available path 
for routing. 
Hybrid model: Hybrid model are designed for large and sustainable WSN. This model uses two 
mechanisms, anomaly-based and signature-based, so it requires high consumption of energy. Table 2 
gives the comparison and characteristics of different IDSs.  
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Table2: Comparison and characteristics of different IDSs model 
9. Conclusion 
This article shows how well a security sensor networks is a challenge for researchers and developers 
of information technology. Our goal was to present the existing security attacks in WSN, focusing on 
intrusion detection systems (IDS), and examine existing approaches of intrusion detection in WSN. 
Our goal was to present the existing security mechanisms for WSN, specifically focusing on intrusion 
detection systems (IDS), and consider existing approaches to provide a fairly comprehensive and 
effective model. We are now working on our own model that incorporates all the advantages of the 
approaches proposed for a global model of intrusion detection in WSN. 
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